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Volume XIII AUGUST, 1938 Number 6
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF
THE CORPORATE FORM OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION
By HAROLD HOLMES BREDELLO
In view of economic and political developments of recent
times it would seem that we might profitably re-examine our
prevailing form of business organization, viz: the corpora-
tion, to determine whether that form still retains the benefits
which it once possessed; whether it is still desirable. The
notion that the corporate form is an indispensable need to
any business organization seems to have, for the past genera-
tion, permeated the thinking of the entire business community
from the great national businesses to the smallest local busi-
ness operated by a single individual. Usually the business-
man's first request to his lawyer is that a corporation be
formed.
The corporation as used today is a modern device. It is
true that the corporation was known to ancient law, and has
been attributed by various writers to Roman law, the Hellenic
law of the time of Solon, pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon law, and
to various other origins. It is not the purpose of this article
to consider the historical basis of the corporation. So far
*Of the Indianapolis Bar.
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as practical present problems are concerned the corporation
did not appear in general common usage in the United States
until the 19th Century, and in fact it is only in the past fifty
years that the corporation has been used so extensively. Prior
to the general usage of the corporate form, enterprises carried
on by more than one individual were organized into partner-
ships. The common partnership possessed many obvious dis-
advantages, and in the face of the advantages (hereinafter
discussed) offered by the corporate form of organization, the
partnership came into comparative disuse. It is, however,
used to a greater extent than commonly supposed, and numer-
ous big businesses are still conducted as partnerships. For
example, practically all brokerage houses are carried on as
partnerships or as individuals, and are required to be so by
the rules of various stock exchanges, but there is a movement
now current to require incorporation of such firms as an aid
to public control.1
However, advantages of the corporation were such as to
attract most businesses into that form of organization. Al-
though the corporate form possessed many benefits, the prin-
cipal ones were two-fold: (1) unity of organization with
continuity of existence unaffected by death or change of mem-
bers composing the organization; and (2) protection of in-
dividual members of the business organization from personal
liability to creditors of the business. In the beginning there
were few, if any, penalties placed by the various governments
upon the corporation as such, and therefore it was natural
that businessmen should rally to the corporate standard.
However, a generation of restrictive regulation and taxation
has changed the original situation, and therefore it might
prove beneficial to weigh by modern standards the benefits and
detriments of the corporate form; or, in other words, we
might ask the question: Is business paying too high a price
for corporate advantages, and is there any way by which
those advantages may be secured without paying that price?
'Meyer, Law of Stock Brokers and Stock Exchanges, (1931) Sec. 8, p. 86;
Constitution of New York Stock Exchange, Art. XX. See also N. Y. Herald
Tribune, March 31, 1938, pp. 23-24, "Incorporating Exchange Firms Urged."
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I
The major disadvantages which have been placed upon the
corporate form result from governmental regulation and from
taxation, both state and federal. We would first consider
certain of the restrictions and regulations which are placed
upon the corporation but not upon the individual. It should
be pointed out that we are considering solely the restrictions
upon business in general and not upon business affected with
a public interest, such as utilities that are subjected to special
regulation. These regulations are generally statutory in
character, and, for purposes of example, let us consider the
regulations of the State of Indiana as indicative of the type
and extent of regulation generally found in this country.
(a) The first general restriction is that relating to the
purpose and function of the corporation. Although modern
legislation has liberalized the scope of corporate authority,
the question of ultra vires acts is still a problem. For ex-
ample, the Indiana Statutes give to corporations the capacity
of natural persons, but limit the corporate authority to "only
such acts as are necessary, convenient or expedient to accom-
plish the purposes for which it is formed." 2 Thus the ques-
tion naturally will arise with respect to corporate action as to
whether such action is necessary, convenient or expedient to
accomplish the limited purposes of the corporation. The
corporation is further restricted with regard to its general
operations, the representation accorded to the owners of the
corporation, the time and place of meetings of its governing
body, and many other such regulations too numerous to be
considered at length.3
(b) The financial affairs of a corporation are also under
strict governmental supervision. The nature and amount of
its capital stock,4 the method of transfer of shares of stock,5
2 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sec. 25-202.
3 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Secs. 25-207, 25-208.
4 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sec. 25-205.
5 Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sec. 25-701
et seq.
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the right to dispose of the assets of the corporation,6 the
right to reduce the amount of capital stock, 7 the right to
distribute the earnings of the corporation,8 and various other
matters relating to the financial affairs of the corporation are
subject to restrictive regulation. In some instances the regu-
lations conflict with other regulations and with practical as-
pects of business. For example, the Indiana law forbids the
declaration and payment of dividends if such payment would
impair the capital of the corporation. 9 On the other hand,
the federal government levies a tax upon the annual net in-
come that is undistributed; thus a corporation might earn
a profit in one year but would still have a deficit carried ove1r
from previous years, so that the corporation would be for-
bidden to declare dividends under the Indiana law, but would
be taxed under the federal law for not distributing the profits
of the current year.'0
(c) The corporation is also burdened with the necessity
of filing reports to various units of government, and is thus
forced to disclose its operations to a greater extent than' re-
quired of individuals. The most universally required reports
are annual reports to the government of the state in which
the corporation was organized or admitted to do business,
and such reports generally require a disclosure of the amount
of capital, the classification of shares, the amount of the cash
or other consideration received for shares, the amount of
business transacted during the year, tangible property em-
ployed within the state, etc." One disclosure particularly
disliked by corporations is the report required by the federal
government showing the names of all officers or employees
receiving compensation of more than $15,000 per year.12
(d) One of the benefits of corporate form deemed im-
portant by businessmen was that the managers of the business
6Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sees. 25-237 to 25-242.
7 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sec. 25-229.
8 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sec. 25-211.
9 See Note 8.
10 U. S. Revenue Act of 1936, Sec. 14; see: Miller, The 1936 Federal Corpo-
rate Surtax, XIII Ind. Law J., p. 19 (Oct., 1936).
11 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Secs. 25-244, 25-302, 25-307.
12 Sec. 148 Revenue Act of 1936.
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could operate as a Board of Directors and escape personal
liability. Because of the abuses practiced by certain individ-
uals, legislative restrictions have been erected which have
imposed so great a personal responsibility upon directors as
practically to destroy this particular advantage. For example,
in Indiana there has been imposed by statute a liability upon
directors for the debts and contracts of a corporation in case
a director knowingly declares or assents to the payment of a
dividend or withdrawal of assets if the corporation's capital
is thereby impaired, or if the director knowingly assents to
the making of a loan to a director or officer without comply-
ing with certain requirements, or if the director shall certify
to any report which is false in any material particulars, etc."'
Such regulations are typical of those found in most jurisdic-.
tions. Various other regulations, such as those imposed by
the Federal Securities and Exchange Act, 4 make the duties
of a director most burdensome and expose the director to a
risk almost as great as if he were transacting business in his
individual right.
(e) Most jurisdictions have strict laws requiring corpo-
rations to maintain agents for service of process and in case
of failure by the corporation to designate an agent, then some
state official, most often the Secretary of State, is arbitrarily
designated by law as agent for the corporation. For example,
under the Indiana law 'a domestic corporation may be sued
wherever it has an office or agency, and a foreign corporation
may be sued in any county in the state where any property
or credits of the corporation may be found.15 The require-
ment that a foreign corporation must designate an agent for
service or be deemed to have acquiesced in the arbitrary
appointment of some public officer as its agent has led to sad
results in certain cases in which default judgments have been
entered against corporations although the responsible cor-
13Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Secs. 25-251 to 25-254.
14Title 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 77 et seq.; providing, among other matters, lia-
bility of directors for statements in prospectus.
15 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Secs. 2-706 and 2-708. See also Sec. 2-804,
providing the manner in which process may be served against both foreign
and domestic corporations.
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porate officers did not have notice of the action; and such
default judgments have been uniformly upheld. 16 Of course
an individual is not subject to suit except in jurisdictions where
he may be found, and in the case of a partnership the partners
may not be sued except in jurisdictions where the partners
may be found; except that individuals and partners are subject
to suit in the county where an office is maintained if action is
based upon business arising out of that office.17
(f) One of the most serious problems of the corporation
is that of doing business in more than one state. Whenever
a corporation engages in business in any state other than the
state of its incorporation it must subject itself to whatever
burdens the foreign state cares to impose upon it as a condi-
tion of doing business. It is well established that since a state
may entirely exclude a foreign corporation it may also impose
whatever conditions it sees fit, subject, however, to the rights
accorded by the Federal Constitution.'
Thus a state may require the qualification of a foreign
corporation by the filing of reports, the obtaining of permits
or certificates, and the payment of fees therefor.' 9 Likewise,
16 Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361; Rarden v.
Baker Co, 271 N. W. 712 (Mich. 1937); Silva v. Crombie & Co., 39 N. Mex.
240, 44 Pac. (2d) 719; S. B. Reese Co. v. Licking Coal etc. Co., 156 Ky. 723,
161 S. W. 1124.
17 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Sec. 2-703.
18Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (1933) Vol. 17, Sec. 8386, pp. 227-228: -'A corpora-
tion has the capacity to exercise its charter powers in other states, but it has
no inherent right to exist or do business there. It derives such right friom the
state, either as a matter of comity, or by affirmative grant. And since a corpo-
ration has no absolute right of recognition in other states, but must depend for
such recognition upon their assent, it follows as a matter of course that such
assent may be granted or withheld in their discretion. Such has long been
the settled rule of the Supreme Court of the United States, the ultimate
authority upon the matter. It has repeatedly recognized the right of a state
to exclude a foreign corporation from its borders, so long as no constitutional
right is violated in such exclusion. . * * * The state in extending to foreign
corporations the privilege of doing business within its borders, may impress
such privilege with whatever conditions and burdens it deems fit to impose,
always provided the limitations, conditions, restrictions and burdens so im-
posed do not infringe upon the rights accorded by the provisions of the Federal
Constitution."
19 Farmer & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Harrah, 47 Ind. 236 (1874); State v.
Siosi Oil Corp., 209 Ind. 394 (1936).
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the state may levy a tax at any rate it pleases as a condition
of admission of a foreign corporation into the state ;20 this
tax may be at a different rate than the tax upon domestic
corporations or individuals ;21 the tax may be based upon the
number of shares of capital stock which is proportionate to
the amount of business carried on within the state to the
amount of total business, 22 or the tax may be based upon the
capital employed in the stat e. 23  An example of the broad
scope permitted to the states is found in the recent case
24
involving the Louisiana state chain store tax. In that case the
United States Supreme Court upheld a tax, the rate of which
was based upon the number of units of a chain outside the
state as well as those within the state.
Although corporations have not been considered as included
within the constitutional safeguard with respect to "privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States," corporations
have been accorded protection under the "equal protection of
the laws" and "due process" clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.25 The Supreme Court has made a distinction between
the conditions which may be exacted for the privilege of
admission to the state and the conditions which may be im-
posed upon a foreign corporation after its admission, and it
has been held that inequalities against foreign corporations
with respect to the admission of the corporations do not con-
flict with the Fourteenth Amendment, but after admission into
the state the foreign corporation is entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws of that state.26
20 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 510 (1926).
21 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147 (1918); People v.
Latrobe, 279 U. S. 421 (1929) ; Kansas City etc. R. R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U. S.
111 (1916).
22 State v. Siosi Oil Corp., supra.
23 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185 (1896).
24 Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 57 Sup. Ci. Rep.
772 (1937).
25 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 58 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 441-
442 (1938).
26 Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra.
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However, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in the
recent case of Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,27
is disturbing not only to foreign corporations but to domestic
corporations as well, because he takes the view that corpora-
tions are not entitled to protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, and he openly states that
the court should now overrule all cases since 1882 which have
interpreted the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment as including corporations. In a
rather lengthy discussion of the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment he concludes that it was meant to cover only
natural persons. If such ideas should gain support in the
court it would seem to leave corporations at the mercy of the
various legislative authorities and would permit any state to
tax corporations, both domestic and foreign, without federal
constitutional restraint. The expression of such ideas would
seem to be another evidence of the tendency to make the
corporate form of organization entirely subject to unre-
strained governmental regulation and taxation.
(g) A new attack upon the corporation is found in the
proposed Federal Corporate Licensing Bill,28 now pending
in Congress. If enacted, all corporations (with certain excep-
tions) engaged in "commerce" must procure a federal license
to do business, and the price of a license would be submission
to such restrictions as: all stockholders given equal voting
rights regardless of charter provisions; Federal Trade Com-
mission would name the person who could act as a stock-
holder's proxy; corporate indebtedness could not exceed value
of capital and surplus; compliance with all federal laws and
Federal Trade Commission rulings, including minimum
wages, collective bargaining, equal wages for women, uniform
accounting practice, etc.
Various other examples of governmental regulation could
be discussed but the foregoing will serve to demonstrate the
type of problem confronting the corporation under modern
governmental regulation.
27 58 Supreme Ct. Rep. 436, 440-442.
28 S. B. 3072-75th Congress, 2nd Session; O'Mahoney-Borah Bill.
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II
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage to the corporate
form of organization is the ever increasing tax burden placed
discriminatorily upon the corporation. The following are
types of taxes imposed upon the corporation which represent
an additional burden over and above the tax imposed upon a
business enterprise conducted by individuals rather than by
corporations :29
(a) The first and most universal tax is the normal federal
corporate income tax, which, under the 1936 Revenue Act,
ranged from 8% to 15% of the net income of the corporation,
and has been increased by the 1938 Revenue Act from 122 %Y
to 16Y2 % of net income. So long as dividends received by the
stockholders were exempt from taxation in the hands of the
stockholders this normal corporate tax was not discrimina-
tory. However, under the present federal law the individual
stockholder must pay a tax upon the income of the corporation
which he receives as a dividend and therefore even the normal
corporate tax represents double taxation of a single business
income.3 0
(b) In addition to the normal tax, there is also imposed
a tax upon profits of the corporation which are in excess of
10% of the adjusted declared value of the capital stock of
the corporation. 81 This tax varies from 6% to 12%, depend-
ing upon the percentage of profit. This tax has been particu-
larly criticized because it is coupled with a Capital Stock
Tax,3 2 which is a tax based upon the declared value of the
capital stock of the corporation. Once this value has been
declared it cannot be changed, and since the excess profit tax
is based upon this arbitrarily declared value the corporation's
officers are forced to guess as to future corporate earnings.
29 Wherever practicable the provisions of the new Revenue Act of 1938,
recently enacted, have been taken into account in the following discussion,
although the variations in the exact rates of the taxes do not affect the propo-
sitions here demonstrated.
30 Sec. 22 of Revenue Act of 1936; Secs. 13, 14 of Revenue Act of 1938.
31 Sec. 602, Revenue Act of 1938.
32 Sec. 105 of Revenue Act of 1935, as amended in 1936; see Title 26
U. S. C. A., Sec. 1358a.
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If the future eanings are underestimated then the corpora-
tion becomes liable for a large excess profits tax, whereas if
the future earnings are overestimated the corporation has
been paying an unnecessarily high capital stock tax. Thus
these two taxes place a corporation in a very difficult position.
It appears that this hardship will be mitigated by the 1938
Revenue Act, which permits a change in declared value every
three years.
(c) Sec. 14 of the Revenue Act of 1936 created what is
known as an undistributed profits tax, which is a complicated
tax upon net profit which is not distributed in dividends. This
tax ranges (under the 1936 Act) from 7% to 27% on the
undistributed income, but has been reduced to 21 2% under
the 1938 Revenue Act (Secs. 13, 14, and 27) ; various credits
and exemptions are allowed, which need not be considered
here.33  The effect of this tax is to force distribution of
earnings, which is often detrimental to the corporation's
financial affairs; and throws the corporate earnings into the
stockholder's taxable income.
(d) In the past, certain persons in the higher income
brackets have utilized the corporate form so that business
profits would not accrue directly to the individuals, or be
charged against individual returns. Any such benefit has now
been cut away by the Revenue Acts of 1936 and 1938 (Sec.
102), which impose a special tax upon corporations which are
deemed to have improperly accumulated a surplus for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of a surtax upon the
shareholders of the corporation. This section of the 1938
Act imposes a tax of 25% to 35% upon the retained net
income of the corporation, depending upon the amount of the
income and the classificatibn of the corporation. Thus this
advantage, to whatever extent it had been utilized, is now
virtually destroyed.
(e) Sec. 351 of the Revenue Act of 1936 imposed a tax
upon what were designated as personal holding companies,
33 For discussion of this tax, see Miller "The 1936 Federal Corporate Sur-
tax," XII Ind. Law J. 19 (Oct., 1936).
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that is, corporations owned by a small number of persons. As
amended in 1937 (Title 26 U. S. C. A., Secs. 331-337d) and
in 1938 (Sec. 402, Revenue Act of 1938) the rate for this
tax was established at 65% on the first $2,000, and 75% in
excess of $2,000 of the undistributed net income of such
corporations.
(f) Social Security Taxes-old age and unemployment-
are additional factors to be taken into account. Although the
extent of the burden varies in different states, and in different
businesses, it should be observed that in many cases the corpo-
ration is paying a tax upon salaries of the active owners of
the business that would be unnecessary if the same payments
were made to the owners as profits.
(g) In addition fo federal taxation most states now levy
various types of taxes upon corporations. For example, in
Indiana corporations are subject to a gross income tax which
is at the same rate as against individuals, but since the share-
holder is subject to this tax upon his dividends from the
corporation this amounts to a double taxation of the same
income.
The extent to which a state may tax corporations, and par-
ticularly corporations engaged in interstate commerce, is
shown by an extensive review of the authorities in the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue et al.,34 wherein
it is shown that a state may tax gross receipts of interstate
commerce in certain situations.
Certain of the taxes hereinabove considered may be modi-
fied or repealed by future legislation. However, it is clear
that the corporation is ever at the mercy of changing laws
and the shifting economic, social, and political views of the
law makers; certainly taxation in the future will not become
any less complex and burdensome. The corporation, as such,.
offers a convenient source of governmental revenue and the
corporation can never be free from the fear of legislation
which will place the corporation at an economic disadvantage
84 58 Supreme Ct. Rep. 546 (Feb. 28, 1938).
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in business competition. For example, the 1938 Revenue Act
has given relief in rates in some situations, but the structure
is still the same, and the possibility of an upward revision of
rates is therefore a constant menace.
Therefore it would seem only natural that businessmen
should ask of the lawyer whether there is any means of escape
from this heavy hand.
III
Although business enterprise would like to be free of the
disadvantages placed upon corporate organization by modern
law, it is doubtful if businessmen would be willing to surrender
the benefits of corporate organization in order to attain this
freedom. Therefore our problem is whether the principal
corporate benefits of continuity of operation and freedom
from personal liability can be obtained in some other form of
business organization.
The form of organization often resorted to is that of a
business trust in some varied form of the type commonly
known as the "Massachusetts trust," i. e., a business operated
like a corporation by trustees instead of directors, under
some form of trust created by the owners of the business
who are the beneficiaries of the trust. Many variations have
been grafted on this form in recent years in an attempt to
give it a character which will avoid governmental regulation
and taxation. However, from a consideration of the authori-
ties it is very doubtful if any form of business trust will
effectively achieve the desired result.
In the first place, the courts of the various states are in
conflict as to the treatment to be accorded to such business
trusts. They are generally held to be valid, but are given
widely different legal effects. For example, in Massachusetts,
the native land of the business trust, it is given validity as a
trust except where the beneficiaries are really the organizers
and managers of the business; and where they have associated
themselves together in such situation, the organization is
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treated as a partnership ;35 in Wisconsin business trusts are
made valid by statute;36 in Missouri the trust is held valid
where the beneficiaries have no control, but the trustees are
held personally liable ;37 in Illinois the trust is held valid and
trustees are not liable as partners if the contracting party
deals with them as trustees. 8  Some states have held such a
trust to be a corporation for practically all corporate pur-
poses. 39 On the other hand, in certain states such trusts are
expressly prohibited from doing business,40 or have been held
to be partnerships or joint stock companies,4 1 and in one state
such an organization is held to be a foreign trust company
and must qualify under trust company laws. 42  In Indiana the
question has not been squarely decided, but in one case the
Indiana Supreme Court recognized that a common law trust
association had the power to hold property,48 while the In-
diana Appellate Court has held that where the party dealing
with the organization had no notice of the trust the organiza-
tion as to such person is treated as a partnership. 44  The
Court there inferred that there might be a different result if
notice had been given, though the Court seemed to frown
upon the idea of a business trust as an attempt to evade both
corporation and partnership law. Thus it is seen that the
validity and effect of a business trust depends apon the view
expressed in a particular jurisdiction, and even in those states
where business trusts are held to be valid there can be no
35 Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355.
3 6 Baker v. Stern, 194- Wis. 233, 216 N. W. 147 (1927).
37 Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S. W. (2d) 163 (1927).
38 Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250 (1927).
39 Hemphill v. Orloff, 238 Mich. 508, 213 N. W. 867 (1927); Wagner v.
Kelson, 195 Ia. 959, 193 N. W. 1; Home Lbr. Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153,
190 Pac. 601. (But see Linn v. Houston, 123 Kan. 409, 255 Pac. 1105, where
trust was held to be a partnership and trustees personally liable if contracting
party did not have notice of limited liability.)
40 State ex rel. v. Paine, 137 Wash. 566, 247 Pac. 476 (1926).
41 Willey v. Hoggson Corp., 90 Fla. 343, 107 So. 408.
42 Superior Oil & Ref. Syndicate v. Handley, 99 Ore. 146, 195 Pac. 159.
4aRidge v. State, 192 Ind. 639 (1922).
4 4 McClaren v. Dawes Elec. Sign & Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. 196 (1927).
See also Brown: "Contractual Limitation of Liability by the So-Called Massa-
chusetts Trust under the Indiana Law," 3 Ind. Law J. 318, 321.
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absolute assurance that this form of organization will afford
protection from a personal liability or escape the burdens of
corporation laws.
It also seems clear that this form of organization cannot
afford any relief from the federal corporation taxes because,
from the pronouncements of the United States Supreme
Court, it would seem that the business trust is treated as a
corporation for federal tax purposes. The Revenue Act of
1936 (Sec. 1001) defines the term "corporation" as includ-
ing "associations." The United States Treasury Department
has, by Article 1001 of Regulations 94, amplified the defini-
tion contained in the statute, and has held that a corporation
as the term is used in the Revenue Act includes any organiza-
tion, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which has the
corporate attributes of representative management and con-
tinuous unity of operation; and it includes a voluntary associa-
tion, a joint stock company, a business trust, Massachusetts
trust, investment trust, and any other organization which is
not an ordinary trust or partnership. The test made by the
Treasury regulations as to whether an organization is an
ordinary trust or a business trust is one of purpose and if a
trust is created for the purpose of carrying on a business for
profit where the property of the trust is supplied by the bene-
ficiaries and certain designated persons are acting as man-
agers, such a trust will be deemed to be a corporation whether
or not the beneficiaries are given any control over the man-
agers. A leading case on this subject which has replaced
earlier tests is that of Morrissey v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue 4 5 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld
the definitiong made by the Treasury Department. This case
has been followed in later decisions of the Supreme Court.46
From these opinions of the Supreme Court it would seem
to be very difficult, if not impossible, to form a business
trust which would not be regarded by the federal taxing
45 296 U. S. 344 (1935).
46 Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 362; Helvering v. Combs, 296 U. S.
326; Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U. S. 369; Lewis & Co. v.
Commissioner, 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799 (1937).
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authorities as a corporate association subject to federal cor-
poration taxes. Therefore it would seem that the business
trust, in whatever modified form, cannot be relied upon
as an alternative form of business organization which will
retain corporate benefits and escape corporate disadvantages.
The same is true of limited partnerships of the type
where all members of the firm are limited partners, because
the Treasury regulations specifically include as corporate
associations "the type of partnerships with limited liability
or partnership associations authorized by the states of Mich-
igan, Pennsylvania, and a few other states." 47  This does
not, however, apply to partnerships in which some are general
and others are limited partners. Such types of partnerships
will be hereinafter discussed.
IV
An elimination of the business trust as a feasible form
of business organization leaves as an alternative for collective
action only the general partnership with whatever modifica-
tions have been or can be grafted upon it. Of course the
general partnership affords relief from corporate taxes be-
cause the partnership as such is not subject to tax,48 but at
the same time a heavier tax burden is thrown upon the indi-
vidual partners in certain cases because all profits of the
partnership, whether distributed or not, are assessed against
the individual partners. If the partners have large enough
net incomes to place them in the higher personal income tax
brackets, then the increase in personal taxes might in some
cases nullify any savings in the corporate tax, although, as
previously pointed out, recent enactments have had the effect
of forcing the distribution of all or a large part of the
corporation net income to the corporate owners.
The greatest objection to the general partnership form
is that it exposes its members to a personal liability that
businessmen generally seem unwilling to assume; yet, as here-
47 Art. 1001-5, Regulations 94 under Revenue Act of 1936.
48 See. 181 et seq., Revenue Act of 1936.
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tofore pointed out, personal liability to some extent has also
been forced upon corporate directors. Even today certain
large businesses, such as the brokerage business, where the
risk of personal liability is relatively great, are carried on
as general partnerships in spite of the risk of personal un-
limited liability.
In many states, as in Indiana, partnerships are permitted
in which some members may be limited or special partners
providing that there are some general partners in the firm.4 9
As hereinabove stated, such partnerships are treated as ordi-
nary partnerships by the federal taxing authorities. Under
the Indiana Act such a partnership is not only given the
attribute of limited liability as to some of its members, but
is also given partial continuity of operation because it is
expressly provided that the partnership is not dissolved by
the sale of the interest of a special or limited partner, or the
death of such partner. However, the special partner's name
may not be used and he may not transact any business for
or be employed by the firm without being deemed to be a
general partner.
While such statutes alleviate to some measure the risk
of personal liability it still leaves the unrestricted personal
liability of the general partner and the necessity for dissolu-
tion of the firm upon the death or retirement of a general
partner. It would seem, however, that the risk of personal
liability can be greatly minimized even as to general partners.
Tort liability has now been practically eliminated by the
general practice of carrying insurance to guard the business
against all possible tort liability. We must still find, how-
ever, a method of limiting liability for debt and contract.
This raises the question whether a firm may not, by some
appropriate means, limit the rights of creditors and other
contracting persons to recourse out of the funds used in the
49 Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933, Secs. 50-101 to 50-118; see comparative
legislation, Mo. Rev. Stats. 1929, Secs. 8875-8887; Page's Gen. Code of Ohio,
Secs. 8036-8058; W. Va. Code of 1931, Ch. 47, Art. 9, Secs. 1-13; Carroll's
Statutes of Ky., 1930, Secs. 3767-3779.
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business. It would seem to be fairly clear that this may be
done in the case of business trusts.50
If this may be done in the case of business trusts what is
to prevent its application to the case of a general partner-
ship? The authorities on this subject are not extensive, ap-
parently because this practice has not been widely followed;
however, the existing authorities would indicate that this
might be done. Story on Partnership, Chap. VIII, Sec. 164,
states the rule as follows:
"There is certainly nothing illegal in a creditor's agreeing to such a
limited responsibility, as a qualification or condition of his contract.
. . .But a qualification agreement of this nature must be proved
and is never presumed without some reasonable proof thereof."
In an early Pennsylvania case51 the Court held that mere
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant
was only a special partner was not enough to limit the plain-
tiff's right of recourse against that partner, but the Court
further stated:
"Had there been a contract, I agree it would be a good defense, as
the parties are competent to make it. But such a contract must clearly
appear."
Professor Warren states his conclusions as follows:
"A petitioner is liable upon ever partnership liability to the last
penny of his fortune, unless there has been an effective agreement with
the partnership creditor to the contrary." 52
* * ,* *
"We see from these authorities that all the judges have agreed,that,
as a general rule, if there is in the contract between the partnership
and a stranger, an express and explicit agreement that the liability of
the partners shall be limited, effect will be given to such agreement." 53
5o McCarthy v. Parker, 243 Mass. 465, 138 N. E. 8; Schumann-Heink v.
Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250, 253: "It is not against public policy to make
an agreement with a creditor that he shall, in case of default in payment, look
exclusively to a particular fund for his reimbursement."
51 Andrews v. Schott, 10 Pa. St. 47, 55.
52 Warren: Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation (1929), p. 355.
53Ibid, p. 367.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In one Texas case54 it was held that the members of
a partnership could not evade personal tort liability under
the master-servant law, by a contract with an employee for
limited liability; however, such tort liability is now eliminated
by various forms of insurance and would not seem to inter-
fere with the right to limit contract liability which has been
generally approved by the courts.55
From these authorities it would appear that the limitation
of liability must be clearly spelled out by the contract. It is
conceivable that in some lines of business such limitation of
liability might handicap the business enterprise as in a situa-
tion where there is competitive bidding and the purchaser
might give preference to a business Organization which did
not so limit its liability. However, in most situations where
a business enterprise would be seeking credit it could limit
the right of recovery to the business assets if its credit stand-
ing as a corporation would have justified such credit. It is a
common practice, particularly in the case of smaller corpora-
tions, for financial institutions to require the endorsing of
contracts and obligations by the principal owners of the busi-
ness as well as by the corporation. Thus it is doubtful if
any substantial business handicap would result from the limita-
tion of liability to the business assets, and thus the corporate
benefit of limited liability might be secured without the
corporate disadvantages.
The question as to the value of limited liability has been
raised by the recent report of a special committee of the New
York Stock Exchange, in which it is urged that the members
of the Exchange be required to incorporate.'; The purposes
sought to be achieved by this proposal are stated to be a more
direct governmental control over the business affairs of the
54 Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, 202 S. W. 343, 348 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1918),
p. 348: "We shall take it for granted that there is a general rule that trustees
and partners can, by previous contract, exempt themselves from personal lia-
bility for contracts and torts," but where the law gives a special status such
as master-servant then such a contract for limited liability is invalid.
55 Shelton v. Montoya Oil & Gas Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 272 S. W. 222, 292
S. W. 165, 167.
56 New York Herald Tribune, March 31, 1938, pp. 23-24, col. 8.
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firms, a greater ability of the firms to secure capital funds,
and the maintenance of an invested capital fund permanently
available to the firm creditors. In answering the argument
that creditors would be deprived of the present unlimited
liability of the partners, the committee points out that, as a
practical matter, unlimited liability is not as great an advan-
tage to the creditors nor as great a disadvantage to the
partners as is generally thought, and the report states that
in no case of the bankruptcy of an Exchange firm had the
creditors ever recovered anything substantial from the per-
sonal assets of a partner.5 7 This report would seem to indi-
cate that the disadvantage of unlimited liability incurred in
the case of a general partner is not of such real detriment
as to deter the adoption of the partnership form of organiza-
tion, even if the devices for securing the limited liability here-
tofore considered were not used.
The other major advantage desired, namely, continuity
of operation, is now possible for a partnership as a practical
proposition by the use of business life insurance, which pro-
vides funds for the settlement of a partner's share without
liquidation of the business.
V
From the foregoing propositions it seems that the follow-
ing conclusions may be fairly drawn:
(1) That the corporation has been subjected to such
discriminatory taxation and regulation as to make the cor-
porate form of business enterprise so expensive that its dis-
advantages equal if not outweigh the advantages of incor-
poration.
57 Ibid "As a practical matter there are no advantages in maintaining un-
limited liability, the report contended. It states that in no case of bankruptcy
has the public ever recovered anything substantial for the outside assets of a
partner. If they are men of integrity all assets have already been put at the
disposal of the firm, and if they were not men of integrity their assets would
already have been hidden before bankruptcy was announced. Personal credi-
tors also have a prior lien on outside assets and by the time a firm is bankrupt
such debts are usually so large that nothing remains for firm creditors."
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(2) That the form of organization known as the "busi-
ness trust" is not more advantageous, because it is also sub-
jected to corporate taxes and because of the confusion in
various jurisdictions as to the status to be accorded to it.
(3) That a strictly limited partnership is not an advan-
tageous alternative form of organization because it is still
subject to federal corporation taxes.
(4) That a general partnership, with special or limited
partners, may be advantageously used because it seems that
such a form of organization is now free from the burden of
corporate taxes; and the corporate benefits of limited liability
and the continuous operation may be achieved by the use of
incidental safeguards such as contracts to limit personal lia-
bility, insurance against tort liability, and business life insur-
ance to cushion the effect of dissolution.
A note of caution should be given with respect to these
conclusions. The partnership form of the nature here dis-
cussed should not be regarded as a panacea in all cases. Many
situations, too numerous to consider here in detail, show that
there are many pitfalls which must be carefully avoided in
the reorganization of a business from a corporate to any
alternative form. Each business must be considered upon its
own particular facts. For example, in some cases the federal
capital gains tax might be such a heavy burden upon the
distribution of corporate assets as to off-set whatever gains
might be realized by some other form of business organiza-
tion. It may be that the corporate form is the only one
possible for large business units with numerous and scattered
stockholders. On the other hand, many small closely held
businesses might profitably consider business organization
along the lines here suggested.
The tax problem is continually shifting, and it is impossible
to predict from one year to the next what course would be
most advantageous and, therefore, any change in the or-
ganizational structure of a business should be cautiously
undertaken only after careful study and with expert guidance
with respect to the peculiar problems presented by each busi-
ness organization.
